"Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition, which is called war; and such a war as is of every man, against every man." (Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. XIII)
2000년 미국에서 열린 국제철학올림피아드의 논제중 하나입니다. 이에 대한 글쓰기의 모범적 사례로서 다음 에세이를 참고로 올려놓습니다. 아래 에세이는 원래는 LSE PPE의 2023년 페이퍼 논제이고 이에 재학중인 학생이 쓴 글입니다. 미국이나 영국대학에서 글쓰기 과제를 주는 것을 살펴봄, 존 로크나 이런 주요한 대회의 논제는 미국이나 영국대학 1학년 교양과목 페이퍼 과제에서 뽑았다는 생각이 들어요.
Q8. Critically evaluate Hobbes's reasons (in Leviathan) for favouring monarchy over sovereign assemblies.
This paper asserts that Hobbes' two reasons for preferring the monarchy are valid yet not enough to be sound. Firstly, this paper introduces his state of nature and the purpose of states, leading to his two arguments for the monarchy. Then, it briefly focuses on the premises already acceptable. Followingly, it deals with the first reason - alignment of interest - with the comparison to democratic states. Next, it discusses the second reason, confirming sovereign assemblies' solidity. Finally, this paper concludes that the two arguments' soundness is ruled out; however, mentioning the need for further evaluations also.
Thomas Hobbes begins his argument with an account of human nature. According to him, human beings can be solely explained materialistically, without incorporeal soul or ideas (Hobbes, 1996, Introduction). So, preserving their bodies is humans' most essential instinct, and a summa malum, or greatest evil, is the fear of death. Due to the variability of desires and scarcity of resources, people inevitably bring themselves into brutal conflicts. From this point, Hobbes deduces the state of nature, an anarchic condition out of the political community, as "a war of all against all" (1996, XIII, p. 88). Hobbes explains that people establish a common power, or by his expression, a commonwealth with authority to command them in all things by agreeing to renounce their rights to all things, i.e., to abide by the laws of nature, in order to avoid the state of nature. Therefore, for Hobbes, the final cause and duty of the state are to maintain peace and order, i.e., out of the state of nature (1996, XVII).
Depending on whom people authorise and transfer their sovereignty to, Hobbes classifies three types of commonwealths. If the representative, or the sovereign, is one person, that is a monarchy. If more than one, it is either an assembly of all, i.e., democracy, or an assembly of parts - i.e., aristocracy (Hobbes, 1996, XIX). Hobbes argues that the monarchy is better than the other two sovereign assemblies for several reasons. Among them can two main reasons be restructured as followings:
Alignment of interests (Hobbes, 1996, p. 131)
(P1) The purpose of the commonwealth is to preserve peace and order.
(P2) When individuals' and communities' interests are harmonised, society can be peaceful and well-ordered.
(P3) Only the monarchy unites the public interest with the private one because of the constant threat from inside and outside, while members in sovereign assemblies prioritise private interests.
(C) The monarchy is preferred to sovereign assemblies as it most likely achieves its objective.
Solidity[1](Hobbes, 1996, p. 132)
(P1) Same as the above
(P4) If the commonwealth is stable and consistent, the society is peaceful and well-ordered.
(P5) The monarchy is more likely to be stable and consistent than sovereign assemblies.
(C) Same as the above
For depth and simplicity, this paper will mainly focus on these two reasons.
We can confirm the validity of his arguments in that premises and conclusions are logically well-connected. All up to us is to evaluate whether each premise is sound. First, (P2) is mostly acceptable since everyone will be drawn into disputes if either interest overrides the other. Then, society becomes chaotic, no different from Hobbes' state of nature; consequently, (P4) is also sound. However, this paper will not further discuss Hobbes' arguments about human nature and the state of nature, which are beyond the scope of our topic. Hence, we will take his state of nature and (P1) for granted. Thus, the soundness of the left premises, i.e. (P3) and (P5), shall be contemplated.
First, (P3) sounds convincing - albeit partially in theory. Since the monarch, as a sovereign, has all the rights of its subjects and prescribes civil law and property (Hobbes, 1996, p.125), keeping the peace, i.e., pursuing the common interest, directly involves its private interest. However, alignment between private and common interests has also been observed in democratic states- and even more lately. Like Hobbes', public interests also entail individuals' interests, even in a democracy. War usually requires the consent of citizens in democratic states. Here, it is natural to deem that people are not willing to decree for themselves all the calamities of war, since it equates to affirming that they will "fight, pay high costs and debts of war from their own resources, and repair the devastation war painfully leaves behind" (Kant, 1795, Section 2). In other words, democratic citizens likewise combine their own interests with public ones because sustaining peace instantly affects their lives, too.
Moreover, when public and private interests conflict, people usually resolve them peacefully or even compromise their private interests because of democratic norms and political structures (Doyle, 1983; Russett, 1993).[2] Empirically, it has also been shown that democratic states have fewer civil wars or invasions, described as the state of nature by Hobbes (Rummel, 1997; Harff, 2003; Abadie, 2004). Thus, Hobbes falls into the hasty generalisation in (P3).
Nevertheless, Hobbesian might argue that some in sovereign assemblies still prioritise private interests, which leaves open the slightest possibility of inner and outer turmoils, whereas the monarchy eliminates it by always uniting the private with the common; hence, the monarchy is better. Yet, many monarchs in history failed to align them. One of the quintessential examples is Nicholas II, a tsar of the Russian Empire. His decision to shoot people on Bloody Sunday in 1905 indicates that not only did he not pursue maintaining order, but he also breached the covenant by harming his subjects. Furthermore, Russia's entering World War I implies that the monarch's private interests may not equate to public ones. He intervened in the war to re-consolidate his power; his interest was the Romanov dynasty's revival. Consequently, he caused many casualties and massive internal rebellions, ending with the Russian Revolution. Thus, it is not sound that the monarchy is preferred as it inherently has identical problems to assemblies.
Regarding (P5), it is partially compelling. Under sovereign assemblies, policies may inconsistently differ depending on which wing seizes power. Also, as shown by a dissolution in the parliamentary system or a lame duck in the presidential system, assemblies can be unstable. Even in emergencies, assemblies' powers tend to concentrate on one figure, namely a temporary dictator or president, like in France or Korea. Nonetheless, it is too hasty to conclude that the monarchy is "more" stable and consistent. The more people are sovereign, the more complex the system is as interests are correlated. Therefore, democracy is more complex than aristocracy, and aristocracy is more than the monarchy. In the monarchy, complexity is reduced, weakening the political system to the point where a little strong wind blows. In a democracy, on the contrary, it seems to falter even in a weaker wind, but because everything is accumulated in complexity, it only falters even if the wind is strong enough to collapse the monarchy. In other words, democracy is solid because it is a chaos-driven, i.e., complex political system. Democracy creates complexity, which does not ruin but further strengthens itself. Real-world politics has shown several examples. Some states, e.g., Syria, where monarchs or dictators rule over a long time (have) experienced severe wars after their politico-economic crisis, while others, e.g. South Korea, remain well despite presidential impeachment.
Hobbes might refute this argument by considering the convenience as well as aptitude of the monarchy. Even though both the monarchy and the assemblies can stay stable and consistent, it is more convenient for the monarchy to facilitate solid decisions. That would be because assemblies are more conflicting among people and time-consuming to reach a consensus. Since no one can go beyond their time, no matter how great a character is, such Hobbes' perspective must be attributed to his childhood and the English Civil War. However, he confuses the solidity of decisions with the solidity of states. Solidity in decisions does not guarantee the commonwealth's solidity, as "the consequence of decisions" is more significant than "what the decision is." Reminding of the above Russian example, Nicholas II's decision was stable and consistent since he conveniently made it by ignoring all advice. Yet, the consequence of his decisions made society more unstable and inconsistent, thereby provoking the bloody revolution. In contrast, the UK has resolved social problems via democratic parliament by considering the results of its decisions. Therefore, the soundness of (P5) in both aptitude and convenience is also ruled out.
To conclude, Hobbes' two arguments for preferring the monarchy to sovereign assemblies, i.e., alignment of interests and solidity, are valid yet insufficient to approve their soundness. This is because both the monarchy and assemblies can merge private and public interests, and both polities and their decisions can also be solid. Hence, it is hard to confirm the superiority of the monarchy to the others. Yet, the fundamental soundness of Hobbes' argument depends on the truth of the remaining undiscussed reasons and his state of nature; thus, further evaluations are required.
[1] Solidity refers to stability and consistency altogether. [2] Refer to the democratic peace theory for more detailed explanations.
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