2020년 존로크 철학부문 'very high commendation'

Moral Obligations in the Employment Contract The complexity of the employer-employee relationship in modern society should not be simplified to a mere economic contract. The ethical principles that uphold the employment contract extend beyond the pressures of self-interest and is indicative of the liberty that the free market embodies. Nevertheless, employment contracts present a moral dilemma between the concept of contract and moral duty. Moral duty refers to a practice universally agreed by the members of society. It is a system of principles of conduct that is expected, but not explicitly enforced by law. But that being said, reprehensible acts of bad conduct may result in social exclusion. On the contrary, an official contract between an employer and employee creates a legal obligation between the two parties. This essay investigates the conditions in which moral duty achieves a higher degree of precedence over the employment contract's legal obligations. The answer it presents contains a consideration of a liberal theory of justice in the employment contract based on the theory developed in the area of political philosophy as an attempt to explore the ethical implications of the nature of employment contracts. More specifically, I will evaluate the term "contract" in relation to its prerequisite, "liberty," from the perspective of John Rawls' theory of justice as fairness. I contend that an employer has a moral duty to pay her employee more than they agreed in the employment contract when: 1. The prerequisites to a moral contract are absent and thereby concludes the contract unjust. 2. One has a moral duty as a member of society regardless of the contract. Rawlsian Justice By definition, a contractarian believes that reciprocity in society is created through a contract, and members of society have a moral obligation to follow the agreed terms of a just contract. A vast majority of contemporary political philosophy has been developed in response to contractarian John Rawls' definition of justice. Examining the conditions to qualify a just employment contract by adapting the framework of Rawls' political liberalism to the circumstances of local justice makes the most sense. First, I develop a concept of a justified contract inspired by Rawl's problem of social justice. The purpose here is to explore the notion of a fair and reciprocal contract between employee and employer. Let us investigate John Rawls' definition of the concept of "justice." John Rawls was a contractarian. He believed that contracts could be justified when an agreement is reached between two equal parties. He believed that equality and liberty are the irreplaceable pillars that sustain what we refer to as "just contracts." According to Rawls' second principle: "Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society." Rawl's two conditions are parts of one principle. The first condition (Fair Equality of Opportunity) states that fair equality of opportunity manages the social contingencies of society's foundational structure and the way they affect talents. On a more political perspective, equality between all members of society is what guarantees true liberty. A fair opportunity can be assured when one's prospects for success in the pursuit of jobs are solely a function of one's abilities and are not a function of her socioeconomic background. The second condition (the difference principle) deals with the disparity that results from the differences in innate talents even after the first condition is in effect. The difference principle reveals Rawls' attitude towards the distribution of wealth and power. It specifies that socioeconomic disparities are permissible only if they benefit the interests of the least advantaged members of society. Simply put, John Rawls' definition of justice revolves around the importance of the contract. To fully understand Rawls' methodology in crafting his principles, we must understand what he describes as "veil of ignorance" and "original position." Picture us sitting behind a veil of ignorance that blinds us from having any knowledge about who we are. The ignorance of our circumstances and social status allows us to determine how society should function most objectively. Rawls entitles this state of equality as the original position. In the original position, everyone is free and equal. People have no idea who they are, their nationality, their physical attributes, their talents, or even where they land on the socioeconomic ladder. When people consider the possibility of a more unfortunate circumstance, logic dictates that society should benefit the least advantaged members of society. Hence, Rawls concludes at his aforementioned principles. Notice that the concept of the original position is defined by freedom and equality. As long as there is consent, minor differences in viewpoints can be disregarded, and the contract is fair. To that extent, Rawls would argue that everyone has a moral duty to follow the exact terms of an employment contract, given that everyone is fair and equal. Suppression of Freedom In an ideal world, John Rawls' description of a fair employment contract seems valid. However, I question the accuracy of Rawls' description of the society we live in. Let us consider Michael Sandel's communitarian tendencies in contrast to John Rawls' contractarian views. Michael Sandel explains that we live in a market society — we live in a world where every aspect of human endeavor affected by market values. But to call the society we live in equal could not be more incorrect. Critics of Rawls, namely Michael Walzer, point the attention to the fact that we live in an uneven playing field. Rawls believed that the employment contract was morally correct as it was a consensus between two equal parties. More often than not, in the market society, the employer has the upper hand in the employment contract over the employee. Admittedly, this is not the case for all industries. In a perfect world, both the employer and the employee are on the same level. The employer has the freedom to pick the strongest, most fitting applicant, and the employee has the freedom to pick the career they wish to pursue. However, the world we live in does not resemble such a society. Philosopher Philip Pettit argues that the suppressor of freedom in our society is "domination." From a position of being dominated, contracts made between two unequal parties can not be free and therefore, can not be justified. Contractarians, like John Rawls, traditionally follow John Stuart Mill's definition of "non-intervention" freedom. Extreme interpretations can go so far as to say that unfair employment contracts can be justified if made under both parties' consent. Pettit disapproves of this philosophy, claiming contracts made without the freedom and equality of both parties mark the contract unjust and irrelevant. In these cases, the employer has a moral duty to pay more than what was initially agreed upon. Consider the following scenario. You have a part-time job at a construction site. You work for a subsidiary of a major Architecture company. You agree to a part-time contract where you will be carrying out several dangerous tasks. You fear the possibility of a major workplace accident but are hesitant to speak up for fear that they will fire you. You need to work today in order to bring food back home to your family. In this hypothetical scenario, the employer and employee's inequality results in the lack of any kind of job security. On a purely interest-related standpoint, the employee has the upper hand in the employment contract because a construction worker can be easily replaced. As a result, the employer is forced to agree on an unfair contract that does not guarantee safety. According to John Stuart Mill's definition of freedom, the employer is not forced to agree or disagree with the terms of the employment contract and is thereby at liberty. Pettit's philosophy disapproves of this rationale. As the employer has an advantage over the employee in the employment contract, the employee is "dominated" by the employer, and is in no position to agree on a fair contract. In other words, the prerequisite to a moral contract, liberty, is nonexistent, and the employer has a moral duty to pay her employee more than they agreed in the contract. Moral Duty Beyond Contract On a similar but slightly different note, an employer might have a moral obligation to pay more than they agreed regardless of the terms of the contract. In another hypothetical scenario, suppose you are the owner of a clothing company. You take your manufacturing base overseas to a third-world country. You hire local citizens to work for your factory. You build a new factory for your company, but the sales seem to drop significantly. You hear the customers saying that the clothes' quality has dropped significantly since the relocation of the manufacturing factory. In an attempt to restore your company's profitability, you then relocate your factory to the previous location. As you and your company prepare to leave, you realize your company is leaving behind toxic pollutants. Most people would frown upon hearing the following scenario for the company's unethical behavior. Why is that the case? What about the scenario is wrong? Aside from the legal obligations to take responsibility for the toxic pollutants, the previous scenario points to a moral injustice by addressing the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). To understand CSR's relevance to the employment contract, we must address Alasdair MacIntyre's criticism directed at Rawls' position on justice. John Rawls shares a similar viewpoint with Ayn Rand in that he believes humans are fundamentally independent and rational. Rawls explains we are like atoms, divided and separated. He also explains that humans have a natural tendency to act based on their economic interests, meaning that humans will favor activities that will most likely maximize their benefit. MacIntyre contends we are not independent and rational beings. MacIntyre explains a "narrative" defines our identity, that our existence depends on the shared time and events in a community. Referring back to the above scenario, a company, much like an individual, is an entity that belongs in a community. From the moment they construct the factory, the company associates themselves as members of the local community. MacIntyre argues that when the company leaves, the company has a moral obligation to repay the social community they belonged in. In this context, the company has a moral obligation as a member of the community to pay the workers more than they agreed in the contract. ​ ​Conclusion In conclusion, no contract is free from flaws. The employment contract is no exception. 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